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RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IN EDUCATION:
A COMPARISON OF NON-ESTABLISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ESTABLISHED RELIGION
IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Jaclyn Kass ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Education is necessary for individuals to participate intelligently
and effectively in society and to become self-sufficient citizens. When
children attend government-funded public schools, the government
1
acts as an educator. Although the government has assumed the responsibility of inculcating young, impressionable people with knowledge and values, the Supreme Court of the United States has not
provided insight into which values should be taught beyond those
2
“necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”
3
Furthermore, judicial interpretations of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment have created a separation between church and
state, which precludes American public schools from teaching or
4
promoting any religious values. The Court has reserved that right
5
for parents.
Conversely, England has had an established church since the six6
teenth century. Under the Education Act of 1944, religious instruc∗
J.D., 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. 2005, Douglass College,
Rutgers University. I would like to thank Professors Angela Carmella and Catherine
McCauliff for their invaluable advice and guidance in writing this Comment.
1
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2
Tyll van Geel, Citizenship Education and the Free Exercise of Religion, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 293, 300 (2000).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
4
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
5
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534•35 (1925).
6
See Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://history
.hanover.edu/texts/engref/er80.html.
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tion was mandatory in any primary or secondary school that received
7
government funds. Although the Act referred to “religion” generally, it inherently encouraged Christianity and demonstrated a new
8
desire to teach children religious values in post-war England. The
inclusion of religion in the Act represented two ideas: first, people
needed to regain faith in the aftermath of World War II; and second,
most religions teach some type of moral code, which, if followed,
9
might prevent the horrors of a world war from reoccurring. Although religion continues to be a part of the national curriculum, a
majority of schools no longer complies with daily prayer requirements, demonstrating that religious practice, though still statutorily
embedded in British education, has less importance in present-day
10
England.
Although the United States and England diverge regarding religion’s place in government, the two countries are aligned in their de11
sire to protect an individual’s right to freedom of religion. That
right is frequently invoked in a school setting because some students
12
require special religious accommodations.
In the United States,
such accommodations or exemptions are permitted only when there
is no “state interest of sufficient magnitude” overriding the student’s
13
interest being asserted under the Free Exercise Clause. Similarly,
England uses a proportionality test created by the European Court of
Human Rights, whereby courts determine the proportionality of the
government aim as it relates to the limitation on an individual’s

7

A. BRADNEY, RELIGIONS, RIGHTS AND LAWS 61 (1993).
Id. For example, the Act required local conferences to create the curricula for
compulsory religious education, and the Act also mandated that conference membership include representatives from the Church of England. Id.
9
See id.
10
See VERA G. MCEWAN, EDUCATION LAW 131 (2d ed. 1999) (“A survey in 1985
found that only 6% of maintained secondary schools” engaged in statutorily mandated collective worship.).
11
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I, with Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.),
available at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/engref/er80.html. See also Council of
Europe, European Convention on Human Rights § 1, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html [hereinafter European Convention].
12
See infra Part IV.
13
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). In Employment Division v. Smith,
the Supreme Court held that an individual is not exempt from a law of general applicability unless more than one constitutional right, or a hybrid of rights, is affected.
494 U.S. 872, 881 (1992). Thus, religious exemptions in the public school setting are
still permissible because they involve the right to free exercise, along with the right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children. See infra Part II.C.
8
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14

right. Because religion is incorporated in the British government,
one might infer that the demand for a religious accommodation in a
public school would present less of a conflict than in the United
States. Yet, curiously, courts in the United States, which are bound by
the rigidity of the U.S. Constitution, are more likely to grant a religious accommodation than courts in England. This Comment attempts to show that because religious freedom has existed in the
United States since its creation, U.S. courts are more sympathetic to
claims for religious accommodation in public schools.
Part II of this Comment explains the separation of church and
state in the United States and the resulting absence of religion from
American public schools. Part II also explains the test courts use to
determine whether an individual is eligible for an exemption. Part
III describes the enactments implemented in England which promote
the protection of an individual’s human rights. Part III also explains
how religion and education are intertwined in England. Finally, Part
IV compares recent cases from the United States and England to
show how England, which does not have a Bill of Rights, has the
flexibility to allow more religious freedom in an educational setting
but nonetheless enforces democratic ideals at the expense of an individual’s rights.
II. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Neutrality in American Public Schools
Unlike England, which openly endorses and funds religious
education for different religions, the Supreme Court of the United
States has struggled over the years to interpret the First Amendment’s
requirement that “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab15
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” espe16
cially in the context of public education. This amendment was intended to promote religious freedom while also creating a religiously
neutral government that neither preferred any religious sect nor
14

Christina Kitterman, Comment, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act of 1998:
Will the Parliament Relinquish Its Sovereignty to Ensure Human Rights Protection in Domestic
Courts?, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 583, 587 (2001) (citing Handyside v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, (1976)).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville Sch.
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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17

supported religion over irreligion.
The Supreme Court has explained that the Establishment Clause prohibits federal and state
governments from setting up churches, forcing people to participate
in religious practices, punishing people based on their religious beliefs, using taxes to fund religious programs or institutions, and par18
ticipating in religious organizations.
Because both the federal and state governments fund and operate public schools, school policies and programs cannot represent religious establishment. The Establishment Clause therefore prohibits
public schools from providing students with religious instruction. For
example, public school programs that allow students to receive religious instruction at their parents’ option once a week during the
regular school day are unconstitutional if the program is held on
19
school property and takes time away from secular studies. These
programs are not religiously neutral because they are implemented
by tax-supported public school systems and utilize tax-supported
20
property. Conversely, a program that releases students early so that
they may pursue religious instruction elsewhere is constitutional because such a policy makes no use of public resources and merely accommodates individuals’ religious needs by rearranging their school
21
schedules.
The Court has further held that public schools would violate the
Establishment Clause if they were to coerce students to support or
22
participate in any form of religious exercise.
In School District v.
Schempp, the Supreme Court held statutes from Pennsylvania and
Maryland as unconstitutional because they required that students re23
cite portions of the Bible at the beginning of each school day. Similarly, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute that mandated all public school students to recite daily a nondenominational
24
prayer written by the State Board of Regents. Although these stat17

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
18
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15•16.
19
McCollum, 333 U.S at 207, 210.
20
Id. at 210.
21
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314•15 (1952).
22
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (prohibiting invocation and
benediction prayers as part of formal public school graduation ceremony); Sch. Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225–26 (1963) (holding unconstitutional statutes that require students to read from the Bible during the school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (invalidating rule requiring recitation of a morning prayer that
was created by state officials).
23
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
24
Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
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utes permitted students to abstain from participating in the exercise,
the use and endorsement of any type of prayer in a public school system nonetheless violated the separation of church and state required
25
by the Establishment Clause. By prohibiting the school-sponsored
recitation of prayers during the school day, the Establishment Clause
furthers the constitutional goal of protecting religious freedom by
26
disallowing the preference of one religious belief over another.
In an effort to further isolate public schools from religion, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that religious prayers
are also prohibited at school-sponsored events outside of the classroom. In Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that state officials could not
27
direct a religious prayer at graduation ceremonies. The reasons the
Court held that the school’s involvement violated the Establishment
Clause were that (1) a school official decided that an opening invocation and closing benediction should be given; (2) the school chose a
clergyman to lead the prayer; and, most importantly, (3) the school
directed the content of the prayer that would be recited at a manda28
Once again, the Supreme Court was contory school ceremony.
cerned that the state-sponsored ceremony violated students’ right to
free exercise by pressuring nonbelievers to participate in a religious
29
activity contrary to their own beliefs.
The Court ultimately opined on the outer boundaries of the Establishment Clause when it upheld the Equal Access Act of 1984, a
law which created an exception to the neutrality requirement in pub30
lic schools. This Act prohibits federally funded, public secondary
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 425; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224•25.
See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431•32.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 586–87.
Id. at 587•89.
Id. at 593.
The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000).
(a) Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, political,
philosophical, or other speech context prohibited
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to
deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any
students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) “Limited open forum” defined
A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during
noninstructional time.
(c) Fair opportunity criteria
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schools from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a
religious, political, or philosophical meeting on school property dur31
ing non-instructional hours. Although faculty may not participate
32
in such meetings, their attendance is required. In Board of Education
33
of Westside Community School v. Mergens, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the Equal Access Act did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was more consistent with an “equal access”
34
policy than a state system of sponsored religion. Additionally, since
the Act requires that meetings occur during non-instructional time
and that faculty be present merely to supervise, the Court held that it
did not create an excessive entanglement of government and relig35
ion.
B. Funding of Religious Education in the United States
The United States’s approach to religion in schools further deviates from England’s approach because the Establishment Clause typically forbids states from providing any type of funding to church36
In England, by contrast, religiously affiliated
related schools.
schools receive government funding. However, case law has gradually
evolved such that states currently are permitted to disburse funds to
37
religious schools under certain circumstances. In Everson v. Board of
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who
wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school
uniformly provides that—
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the
government, or its agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere
with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or
regularly attend activities of student groups.
Id. § 4071(a), (b), (c).
31
Id. § 4071(a), (b).
32
Id. § 4071(c)(3).
33
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
34
Id. at 250•53.
35
Id. at 253.
36
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n
of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
37
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (no violation of the Establishment Clause where states provide parents with funding to send their children to
public or private schools and parents privately choose where their children will attend school); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (allowing federal government
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38

Education, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
New Jersey local school board policy of reimbursing parents for using
39
public transportation buses to send their children to school. Pursuant to this policy, parents received funds irrespective of whether their
40
children attended public or Catholic parochial schools. While acknowledging the wall of separation between church and state, the
Supreme Court upheld the policy because it applied to all people
41
It was, therefore,
generally, regardless of their religious beliefs.
“neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non42
believers.”
43
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court developed a threepronged test to determine whether statutes granting funding for
education in religiously affiliated schools violate the Establishment
44
To survive constitutional scrutiny, a “statute must have a
Clause.
secular legislative purpose . . . , its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . , [and it] must not
45
A
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”
finding of excessive entanglement is based on “the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the gov46
ernment and the religious authority.”
The statutes at issue in
Lemon, however, did not survive constitutional scrutiny because the
Supreme Court concluded that the funding programs constituted an
47
“excessive entanglement between government and religion.”
To help low-achieving children meet state performance standards, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (“Title I”), which provides additional funding

to provide religiously affiliated schools with aid where such aid is used to purchase
educational materials and equipment); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(holding that school board could reimburse parents for transportation expenses incurred when sending children to school regardless of whether children attended
public or private parochial schools because statute applied generally regardless of
religious belief).
38
330 U.S. 1.
39
Id. at 3.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 18.
42
Id.
43
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44
Id. at 612–13.
45
Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
46
Id. at 615.
47
Id. at 614.
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48

to local educational agencies (LEAs). Student eligibility does not
depend on whether the child goes to a public or a private school, but
rather on the character of the benefits provided by the funding: to
49
qualify, the benefits must be “secular, neutral, and nonideological.”
The use of this aid has raised various Establishment Clause is50
51
sues. In Agostini v. Felton, the Board of Education of the City of
New York, along with a group of parents, sought relief from an injunction preventing Title I teachers from providing aid to students in
52
After concluding that Title I teachers
religious private schools.
could work in religious private schools because their presence neither
promoted nor inhibited religion, the Supreme Court also held that
the “excessive entanglement” analysis and the “impermissible effect”
53
analysis were essentially the same. Thus, the Supreme Court elimi54
nated the entanglement factor of the Lemon test, making only the
55
first two Lemon factors relevant to the school aid question. Notably,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that some interaction or entan56
glement between the church and the state is inevitable. By allowing
children to receive necessary aid for secular subjects in religious
schools, the Supreme Court promoted the right to free exercise be-

48

20 U.S.C. § 6312(a)–(b) (2000). The LEA must apply to its state education
agency for federal funds. Id. § 6312(e). The LEA must create a plan describing the
programs it will implement to meet the special education needs of children from
low-income families. Id. The state education agency must approve the plan before
the LEA receives any funding. Id. § 6312(e)(2).
49
Id. § 6320(a)(2).
50
Aguilar v. Felton established an automatic presumption of excessive entanglement of government and religion when federally funded services are provided inside
a parochial school. 473 U.S. 402, 412•14 (1985). As a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Aguilar, the New York Legislature enacted a statute creating a separate
school district for a small orthodox Jewish village. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S.
687, 692•93 (1994). Because village residents did not want their children attending
schools outside of the community, the creation of a separate school district allowed
them to open a publicly funded special education school inside the village. Id. at
694. Eligible children could then receive benefits. Id. While acknowledging the
state’s right to accommodate religious needs, the Supreme Court found that this
statute conferred benefits on a religious sect in a non-neutral manner and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 704•05.
51
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
52
Id. at 212–14. After the Supreme Court held in Aguilar that the Board’s Title I
program violated the Establishment Clause, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York ordered an injunction, which remained in effect until the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Agostini twelve years later. Id. at 208•09.
53
Id. at 232.
54
Id. at 233.
55
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000).
56
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
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cause parents were able to send their children to any school without
57
worrying that their children would be denied these benefits.
58
In Mitchell v. Helms, which involved a program similar to that in
Agostini, the Supreme Court focused its decision on neutrality and
59
private choice. The Court held that as long as the state offers aid
“to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion,” then the program is neutral and religious indoctrination is not
60
attributable to the state. The Court further held that an individual
who qualifies for aid through a neutral program has the private right
61
to choose where he or she wants to go to school. Such a decision
62
cannot be attributed to the state. Similarly, in Zelman v. Simmons63
Harris, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio voucher program that
provided parents with monetary grants to send their children to any
school, public or private—even religious—within the Cleveland City
64
Because the program was one of true private
School District.
choice, the Supreme Court held that it was entirely neutral toward re65
ligion.
Claims regarding violations of the Establishment Clause based
on the distribution of aid often occur in impoverished areas where a
large number of students attend religiously affiliated private schools
66
which offer a better education than local public schools. To enjoy
fully the freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, children
67
from these underprivileged areas need the best education possible.
Without education, these children would never be able to participate
68
effectively in democratic society. Opponents of programs that provide aid equally to both public and private schools focus on the for69
mal concerns of the Establishment Clause.
They ignore the fact
that education provided in these failing school districts is not really
comparable to public education elsewhere and deny these students
57

Id. at 213. Due to the increased costs associated with modifying the Title I program to comply with the terms of the injunction, fewer students were receiving benefits from Title I funding. Id.
58
530 U.S. at 793.
59
Id. at 810–11.
60
Id. at 809.
61
Id. at 811.
62
Id.
63
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
64
Id. at 645•46, 653.
65
Id. at 653.
66
See id. at 681•82 (Thomas, J., concurring); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 830.
67
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681•82 (Thomas, J., concurring).
68
Id.
69
Id.
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70

the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the opinions in Mitchell and Zelman focus on the need to
educate children in impoverished areas, these decisions nonetheless
promote the right to free exercise because children will not be denied an education based on their choice of a religious school.
C. Exemptions for Free Exercise from Generally Applicable Rules
Sometimes laws that apply to the general population conflict
with an individual’s religious beliefs, infringing on his or her right to
free exercise, and courts are subsequently required to resolve the dispute, either ruling in favor of an orderly society or affirming the individual’s fundamental rights. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the First Amendment rights of Amish
children whose religious beliefs conflicted with a state statute requir71
ing them to attend public or private school until the age of sixteen.
The parents of several children were convicted of violating the statute
when they refused to send their children to school after the children
72
completed the eighth grade. The parents argued that the statute
infringed upon their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because sending their children to high school directly conflicted with
73
the Amish religion and lifestyle.
The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could not compel
school attendance against a claim of religious interference unless the
requirement on its face did not impede the free exercise of religion
or the state’s interest was compelling enough to exceed protection of
74
The Supreme Court
the individual’s First Amendment right.
agreed that Wisconsin had an undeniable interest in educating children but said that the state’s interest in education was not automatically superior to other interests because “only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti75
mate claims to the free exercise of religion.”
When balancing the importance of the various interests, the Supreme Court considered the genuineness of the parents’ claims and
emphasized the difference between mere personal preference and
sincere religious belief, concluding that the parents’ claims in Yoder

70
71
72
73
74
75

Id.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 208•09.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 214•15.
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76

were religiously grounded. The Supreme Court found that the Wisconsin statute severely impeded the Amish children’s free exercise of
religion because their religion, which has existed for centuries, is
founded upon a simple lifestyle that ignores advances in technology,
along with current societal norms, and instead focuses on devotion to
77
Forcing Amish children to attend
God, family, and community.
public high school would compromise their religious beliefs by exposing them to values contrary to their own and to excessive pressure
78
from their peers to conform.
The Supreme Court then noted that certain religiously motivated behavior could be subject to regulations of general applicability
intended “to promote the health, safety, and general welfare” of the
79
public. The state argued that it had a strong interest in creating
self-sufficient individuals capable of intelligently participating in society, but the Supreme Court did not agree that this interest was com80
The Amish
pelling enough to infringe upon the Amish beliefs.
people were already a self-sufficient community that had existed for
hundreds of years; one or two extra years of education would have lit81
tle beneficial effect on their lives. Because the Amish parents did
not jeopardize the health or well-being of their children, the Supreme Court further explained that the right of the parents to direct
the upbringing of their children, in conjunction with their First
Amendment right to exercise religion freely, outweighed the state’s
82
“compelling” interest. The Supreme Court concluded that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from requiring the
Amish to send their children to public high schools, essentially ex83
empting the Amish people from the rule.
84
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court distinguished its rule regarding laws of general applicability from the balancing test established in Yoder. In Smith, two individuals were discharged from their jobs after they ingested peyote during a Native

76

Id. at 215•16.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
78
Id. at 217•18.
79
Id. at 220.
80
Id. at 221.
81
Id. at 222.
82
Id. at 233•34.
83
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234•35.
84
494 U.S. 872 (1992). Although Smith did not involve a claim for an exemption
arising from a student in a public school setting, the holding still affects students requiring religious accommodations.
77
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85

American religious ceremony. The use of the peyote violated an
Oregon law which prohibited the possession of certain controlled
86
substances. The Supreme Court considered whether the prohibi87
tion of the religious use of peyote violated the Free Exercise Clause.
The Supreme Court refused to exempt the individuals from the
Oregon law because it was a neutral, generally applicable law not in88
tended to promote or oppress any religious beliefs. To maintain an
orderly, democratic society, states must be permitted to regulate and
89
citizens must abide by certain laws. The Supreme Court explained
that the holding in Yoder, which allows the court to use a compelling
interest test, applied only because that case involved a “hybrid” or a
combination of constitutional rights—the right to free exercise and
90
the right to direct the upbringing of one’s children. This conclusion supports the idea that two claims involving infringements of constitutional rights, which would fail if alleged separately, have the potential to succeed when they are asserted as a combination because
the hybrid of constitutional rights triggers the compelling interest
91
test.

85

Id. at 874.
Id.
87
Id. at 876. After the two individuals lost their jobs, they applied for unemployment, and the Employment Division denied their request for benefits because
they were discharged for misconduct. Id. at 874. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that it violated the employees’ right to free exercise of
religion. Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed again. Id. at 875. The Supreme Court of the United States remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of
Oregon could decide whether peyote was included within the Oregon statute as a
controlled substance. Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that peyote was included in the statute but that the employees’ First Amendment rights were violated.
Id. at 876. The Employment Division appealed. Id.
88
Id. at 879 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
594•95 (1940)).
89
Id. at 879.
90
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
91
William L. Esser, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or
Constitutional Smokescreen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 218•19 (1998). But see
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring):
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a
hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover
the situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational
rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim
is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a
formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional
provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in what
86
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III. ESTABLISHED RELIGION IN ENGLAND
A. History of Religious Freedom in England
The 1559 Act of Uniformity established the Church of England
92
as the national religion. Despite the Anglican establishment, England has worked vigorously to protect religious freedom for all relig93
ions. While the Church of England may appear to be the preferred
religion, today England tolerates all minority faiths and guarantees
them freedom of worship and the freedom to practice their religion
94
in public. Additionally, the functions of the Church do not coin95
cide with the functions of public government. The House of Lords
recently held that, under the Human Rights Act of 1998, the Church
96
of England is not a “public authority.”
England does not have a written constitution or a bill of rights
like the United States, but the common law and statutes tend to pro97
tect civil liberties. Additionally, England adheres to the European
98
Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (“Convention”). The European Council, which was formed after the conclusion of World War
II, enacted the Convention to protect various fundamental freedoms
99
and rights. Article 9 of the Convention states:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the

Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause
at all.
Id.
92

Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., c. 2 (Eng.), available at http://history.hanover
.edu/texts/engref/er80.html.
93
Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment
Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 917 (2005).
94
Id.
95
Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49
MCGILL L.J. 635, 639 (2004).
96
Id.
97
Albert, supra note 93, at 918.
98
European Convention, supra note 11.
99
Kitterman, supra note 14, at 584•85.
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protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of
100
the rights and freedoms of others.

Another relevant provision of the Convention is Article 2 of Protocol
1, which states:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise
of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to
teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure
such education and teaching in conformity with their own relig101
ions and philosophical convictions.

The United Kingdom incorporated the Convention into its do102
The
mestic law when it enacted the Human Rights Act of 1998.
Human Rights Act allows British citizens to bring claims of human
103
rights violations directly before British courts.
British courts inter104
pret current legislation so that it conforms to the Convention.
Opinions from the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg
105
help guide British decisions, but they are not binding.
B. Education in England
Religious schools in England and Wales are found in both the
106
Engprivate sector and a predominant part of the public sector.
107
land funds both types of schools.
In contrast to American schools,
which are governed by state and local rules, educational standards in
108
England are governed by Parliamentary legislation.
Modern education law in England and Wales was developed
through various legislative acts beginning with the Education Act

100

European Convention, supra note 11.
Council of Europe, Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights
art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html.
102
Ariel Bendor & Zeev Segal, Constitutionalism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient
Constitutional Culture, a New Judicial Review Model, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 683, 685
(2002).
103
Kitterman, supra note 14, at 589.
104
Id. at 592.
105
Id. at 591. Individuals who reside in countries that adhere to the Convention
can bring claims of human rights violations directly to the European Court of Human Rights, whose decisions are binding on member countries. Id. at 585•86. If a
British court cannot provide an adequate remedy, then individuals still can bring
their claims before the European Court of Human Rights. Id. at 594.
106
C.M.A. McCauliff, Distant Mirror or Preview of Our Future: Does Locke v. Davey
Prevent American Use of Creative English Financing for Religious Schools?, 29 VT. L. REV.
365, 375 (2005).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 380•81.
101
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109

1944.
The 1944 Act created a new system of education in post-war
110
A frequently litigated provision of the 1944 Act, which
England.
111
will be demonstrated in one of the cases below, requires an LEA to
112
provide students with transportation to and from school. This provision created many conflicts because the 1944 Act also granted parents the right to choose which school their children would attend,
113
and sometimes a preferred school was located far away.
Under the 1944 Act, an LEA “w[as] obliged . . . to have regard to
parental preference,” but the Education Act 1980 made it a manda114
tory requirement for an LEA to comply with a parent’s request.
The Education Reform Act 1988 further advanced parental rights
and preferences by giving them greater choices regarding where their
children would attend school, influence over the governing bodies,
115
and control of certain types of schools. A parent will usually prefer
116
one school over another for religious reasons.
The Education Act
1996 repealed the earlier Acts to consolidate all of the modern law,
and the Education Act 1998 established the current structure of
117
schools.
There are five main types of schools in England: maintained,
118
community, voluntary, independent, and foundation schools.
Under the 1944 Act, an LEA was required to provide “a variety of educa119
tion for children of compulsory school age.” LEAs own both main120
tained and community schools.
Voluntary schools, which are only
assisted rather than owned by LEAs, receive various amounts of government funding and usually serve a particular religious persua121
These schools are often started by groups who believe that
sion.
the government’s educational guidelines are inconsistent with their
own religious beliefs but who cannot afford to finance a private

109

MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 3–5. This Comment does not discuss the majority
of these acts because most of them focused on a specific aspect of the education system in England not relevant to the topic of this Comment. Id.
110
Id. at 3.
111
See infra Part IV.E.
112
MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 4.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 5.
115
Id.
116
BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 65.
117
MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 6•7.
118
Id. at 16•22.
119
Id. at 16.
120
Id. at 16•17.
121
Id. at 19.
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122

school independently. Although any religious school can apply for
voluntary-aided status, it has been argued that the system inherently
discriminates, as Muslim applications have consistently been turned
123
down on procedural or technical grounds.
Independent schools are the equivalent of American private
124
schools.
Independent schools maintain private contracts with stu125
dents and are therefore not subject to judicial review. A significant
number of independent schools serve religious traditions that have
126
only recently arrived in Great Britain, such as Islam and Judaism.
Criticism of the curricula and teachers at independent schools, however, has made it difficult for religious groups to set up such schools
127
in their communities.
128
Curricula in England and Wales are mostly secular.
With the
exception of independent schools, the government requires all
129
schools in England and Wales to implement a national curriculum.
Under the 1998 Act, a daily act of worship is still required in all
schools (with an exception again for independent schools), but reports have shown that less than seventy percent of schools comply
130
Religious education, however, continues to
with the requirement.
131
be a part of the basic curriculum.
The British government intentionally wove Christianity into
132
education law.
Since the enactment of the 1944 Act, people have
133
gradually drifted away from religion. When the British government
enacted the 1988 Act, Parliament consciously placed Christian educa134
tion at the center of all religious education.
In fact, the 1988 Act
was the first time Parliament explicitly mentioned “Christianity” in a
135
British law, however, does not
provision of education legislation.
122

BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 67.
Id. at 68. One Muslim school was not large enough for voluntary status. Id.
124
See MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 20.
125
Id. (citing R v. Headmaster of Fernhill Manor Sch., ex parte Brown [1993] 1
FLR 620. (1992)).
126
BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 69.
127
Id. at 70.
128
See MCEWAN, supra note 10, at 123•24. In the national curriculum, the three
core subjects are English, math, and science. Id. Other subjects include “history, geography, technology, music, art, physical education, and a modern language.” Id.
129
Id. at 124.
130
Id. at 131.
131
Id.
132
BRADNEY, supra note 7, at 60.
133
Id. at 65.
134
Id.
135
Id.
123
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specifically limit religious schools to Christianity; currently there are a
136
Although the
small number of Jewish and Muslim schools as well.
educational trend in Great Britain is toward freedom of religion and
individual autonomy, modern legislation, particularly the 1988 Act,
indoctrinates children with Christian beliefs because such legislation
137
teaches children that Christianity represents community values.
Thus, the predominant absence of religion from American public schools, which is the result of the First Amendment’s prohibition
of establishment, tends to promote more religious freedom than the
138
In contrast to British education, which has legislaBritish system.
tively and in practice endorsed Christianity as the core faith, American education, which supports no religious beliefs, effectively treats
all religions equally from the beginning. As religious exceptions or
accommodations are necessary, courts have the ability to grant them
139
to protect the individual’s right to free exercise.
IV. RECENT CASES
England continues to have an established religion. After America won its freedom from England, its founders did not want to create
a nation that fostered the same type of religious establishment. Thus,
the Establishment Clause was included in the Bill of Rights, formally
prohibiting established religion. “Establishment[, however,] is, in
fact, consistent with religious freedom . . . . Even if a state does not
have an established church, it will have an established position on religion. A secular, liberal state is not ‘neutral’. It tolerates religions
140
Although England still has an established
on its own terms.”
church, the United States and England both encourage religious
freedom. The Bill of Rights automatically grants American citizens
the right to free exercise of religion, and the courts then decide at
what point that right should be curtailed for the sake of maintaining
a civilized society. Conversely, British courts, which are not bound by
a Bill of Rights, have the liberty to grant additional rights as they are
requested. As in the United States, however, rights can be denied for
the sake of maintaining order.
As the following cases will show, the United States tends to be
slightly more tolerant in the classroom because the American method
136

Id. at 67.
Id. at 71. This is the opposite of the American goal to prevent religious indoctrination in public schools.
138
See supra Part II.A.
139
See supra Part II.C.
140
Ahdar & Leigh, supra note 95, at 637.
137
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focuses on the rights of the individual, while England’s focus is the
availability or lack of alternatives to the circumstances creating the
problem. Because all of the British cases involve parents enforcing
religious rights in a school setting, this Comment compares them using the Yoder analysis, which requires a court to examine a combination of rights. Yet in either country accommodation will sometimes
be denied for the sake of some compelling government interest.
A. Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education

141

In this U.S. case, the plaintiff sued the defendant school district,
claiming that the district’s mandatory uniform policy was unconstitutional because the policy did not contain any provisions permitting
142
students to “opt-out” for religious reasons.
The plaintiff filed a
complaint after her great-grandson was suspended from school for
143
The great-grandmother
not complying with a new uniform policy.
stated that the policy infringed upon her right to free exercise and
her right, as her great-grandson’s legal guardian, to direct his up144
More specifically, the grandmother believed that combringing.
pelling students to wear uniforms eliminates an individual’s free will
and is “characteristic of the ‘last days’ and required by the anti145
As such, her religion required her to oppose the antiChrist.”
Christ and prevent her children from becoming indoctrinated with
146
his orders and his mark.
The district court explained that the circumstances of this case
could fall under the hybrid-rights exemption demonstrated by Yoder,
and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to strict scrutiny review of
147
the uniform policy.
Notably, this opinion denied only the defendant’s motion for summary judgment; the court did not resolve the
148
In its reasoning, the court emphasized the alissue on its merits.
ready established right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
149
children and stated that the Supreme Court of the United States
has protected religious beliefs under the First Amendment even

141

93 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
Id. at 652.
143
Id. at 654.
144
Id. at 657.
145
Id. at 653.
146
Id. at 653•54.
147
Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
148
Id. at 663.
149
Id. at 658 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
142
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when such beliefs are not “acceptable, logical, consistent, or compre150
hensible to others.”
However, applying the balancing test from Yoder, a court would
have to compare the sincerity of the religious beliefs with the government interest. In Yoder, the court partially based this determination on the established history of the Amish religion and its tradi151
tions.
While there is no subsequent history to Hicks, one can
predict that it would likely lose on its merits. Although the uniform
policy may have imposed some burden on the grandmother’s rights,
a court could easily conclude that the Board of Education had a compelling interest in creating a uniform policy. Specifically, the Board
stated that the policy had the following benefits: “1) improved student behavior, 2) increased safety in schools, 3) increased sense of
belonging and school pride among students, 4) increased emphasis
on individual personality and achievement rather than outward appearance among students, and 5) elimination of negative distinctions
152
Moreover, the Board spoke
between wealthy and needy children.”
to local parents with various religious affiliations who all stated that a
153
uniform policy would not violate their religious beliefs. The Board
knew that the plaintiff was opposed to the policy, but the Board could
154
not understand how its policy offended the plaintiff’s religion, indicating that the burden on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs may not
have been substantial enough to permit a religious exemption.
B. Cheema v. Thompson

155

In Cheema, another U.S. case, three Khalsa Sikh children brought
suit against the defendant school district because a policy banning
students from bringing weapons to school infringed upon the students’ right to free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom
156
Restoration Act (RFRA). One of the tenets of the Sikh religion re150

Id. at 657 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 714 (1981).
151
See supra Part II.C.
152
Hicks, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
153
Id. at 653.
154
Id.
155
67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
156
Id. at 884•85. RFRA states in relevant part:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—
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quired the students to carry a “kirpan,” or ceremonial knife on their
157
Because the children demonstrated that carryperson at all times.
ing a kirpan was part of a sincerely held religious belief and that the
school policy substantially burdened their religious beliefs, the burden then shifted to the school board to demonstrate that the prohibi158
After the
tion of the kirpans served a compelling state interest.
school board failed to establish its burden, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction granted by the
district court allowing the students to continue wearing their knives
159
to school.
Notably, the court of appeals, like the district court in Hicks, did
not rule on the merits; rather, the court held that the plaintiffs have
160
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.
The court
seemed to punish the school district for not pleading enough facts
and refrained from deciding whether the government interest outweighed the children’s First Amendment rights. In this respect, the
161
dissenting opinion, which opposed the terms of the injunction, is
more persuasive because it emphasized the danger in allowing students to carry knives to school and the importance of maintaining a
162
The dissent explained that, although
safe environment in schools.
the kirpan may have spiritual meaning to the Sikhs, it is still a knife
and the Sikh religion dictates that it be used for self-defense pur163
The evidence also showed that on several occasions the
poses.
plaintiff children removed their knives from the sheaths; should we
therefore assume that young Sikh children understand the purpose
of the kirpan or are capable of assessing the type of situation that
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). The dissent in
Cheema notes that Congress enacted these provisions as a response to the Supreme
Court decision in Smith, which refused to grant individuals exemptions to laws of
general applicability. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 888•89. The Supreme Court of the United
States invalidated the statute several years later in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
157
Cheema, 67 F.3d at 884. The knife has a steel blade, approximately seven inches
long and more than three inches wide. Id.
158
Id. at 885.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
The dissent expressed concern about the fact that the injunction only required
the kirpan be sewn, instead of riveted, to the sheath, which would still enable Sikh
children to remove the kirpan from the sheath. Id. at 888.
162
Cheema, 67 F.3d at 889•90.
163
Id. at 890.

KASS (FINAL)

12/1/2008 12:42:49 PM

2008]

COMMENT

1525

164

warrants self-defense?
Cheema provides a good example of circumstances where there are foreseeable risks associated with accommodating a student’s religious beliefs, but a Yoder analysis nonetheless
would likely protect those religious beliefs.
C. Sherr v. Northport–East Northport Union Free
165
School District
In Sherr, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York considered the validity of a school policy requiring certain immunizations unless the students were “bona fide members of a rec166
Two families objected to the imognized religious organization.”
munization of their children for religious reasons and were denied
an exemption because they did not belong to a recognized religious
167
The district court recognized the compelling govorganization.
ernment interest in mandatory inoculations but ultimately held that
by limiting the exemption to members of a recognized religion the
provision was unconstitutional because it preferred some religions
over others and prevented individuals from the free exercise of religion, violating the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
168
The district court then concluded that both plaintiffs
respectively.
169
The court
offered religious reasons for requesting an exemption.
held, however, that only one of the two plaintiffs held sincere religious beliefs and, therefore, only one plaintiff was entitled to an ex170
emption from the vaccination rule.
One should note that Hicks, Cheema, and Sherr all involve individuals who identify with religions represented by a small percentage
of the American population. Clearly laws are less likely to conflict
with the religious beliefs of individuals who are represented by a majority. For example, if a majority of American people were required
to carry knives for religious reasons, such a practice would likely be
the societal norm and students would not need an exception to the
rule. As the following cases show, the circumstances are similar in
England; however, England will not grant exemptions unless there is
no viable alternative.
164

Id. at 890•91.
672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
166
Id. at 87.
167
Id. at 88.
168
Id. at 89•91.
169
Id. at 93•94.
170
Id. at 96•97. One of the plaintiffs admitted to joining a religious group with
the sole purpose of obtaining an exemption. Id.
165
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D. R v. Head Teacher & Governors of Denbigh High School

171

Denbigh High School is in a “maintained secondary community
172
school” that educates students aged eleven through sixteen.
The
school has students from twenty-one different ethnic groups, but the
173
majority of students is Muslim.
The majority of the school officials
174
is also Muslim, including the head teacher, Yasmin Bevan.
“The head teacher believes that school uniform plays an integral
part in securing high and improving standards, serving the needs of a
diverse community, promoting a positive sense of communal identity
175
and avoiding manifest disparities of wealth and style.”
One of the
uniform options, the shalwar kameeze, was approved by imams from
local mosques as an appropriate form of modest dress for Muslim
176
177
girls. The school governors also approved certain headscarves.
Shabina was a Muslim girl and her family chose this particular
178
school even though it was outside of her school district.
She knew
about the dress code prior to entering the school, and she wore the
uniform for two years before asking if she could wear a long coat-like
garment called a jilbab, which covered “the contours of the female
179
The assistant head teacher refused the request and sent
body.”
180
After that incident, the head teacher sent a letter
Shabina home.
home stating that the student was required to attend school in the
appropriate uniform and that the Education Welfare Services (EWS)
181
would be notified if she failed to attend school.
The student claimed that the head teacher, the governors, and
the LEA violated her human rights under the United Kingdom and
182
European human rights law discussed above.
Opinions were then
gathered from various imams regarding the appropriate dress for
183
Some stated that the shalwar kameeze did not proMuslim girls.
vide the appropriate amount of coverage and others said that it was

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

(2006) UKHL 15, (2006) All ER 487.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 7.
Denbigh High School, ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 9•10.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
Denbigh High School, ¶ 13.
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184

acceptable.
The head teacher “felt that adherence to the school
uniform policy was necessary to promote inclusion and social cohesion, fearing that new variants would encourage the formation of
groups or cliques identified by their clothing . . . . The school uniform had been designed to avoid the development of sub-groups
185
identified by dress.”
The student further claimed that Denbigh High School limited
her right to her religion or her beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights of 1950, and
denied her the right to education under Article 2 of the First Proto186
Judge Bennett rejected Shabina’s claims at
col of the Convention.
187
the first trial.
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision and the
188
head teacher and the governors of Denbigh High School appealed.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill stated that Article 9 “protects both the
right to hold a belief, which is absolute, and a right to manifest belief,
189
which is qualified.” The student in this case had a sincere religious
190
belief, even if that belief changed as she matured.
Not all acts motivated by religious belief will be protected by Article 9. Such a determination depends on the circumstances of the
case. In an employment context, the European Court of Human
Rights will not find an interference with one’s right to manifest religious beliefs when a person voluntarily accepts employment that does
not accommodate a specific religious practice and there are alterna191
tive options that do not present undue hardship or inconvenience.
One case from Greece stated that Article 9 did not grant a Jehovah’s
Witness an exemption from a disciplinary rule that required students
to participate in a National Parade, when the rule was applied gener192
Because the student in Denbigh
ally and in a neutral manner.
chose a school that was outside of her district, she knew about the
uniform policy before she started attending, and there were three
other schools in the area which permitted the wearing of the jilbab,

184

Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶ 18.
186
Id. ¶ 1.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Denbigh High School, ¶ 36 (citing Christian Educ. S. Afr. v. Minister of Educ.,
(2000) 9 BHRC 53 at 70).
190
Id. ¶ 36.
191
Id. ¶ 23.
192
Id.
185
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Lord Bingham concluded that there was no interference with the
193
right to manifest religious beliefs.
To be justified, an interference must be prescribed by law and
194
necessary for a specific democratic purpose. A school uniform policy is not necessarily law, but it is prescribed by the school for a spe195
cific purpose.
Therefore, the school was justified in its actions and
196
did not need to change its uniform policy.
Additionally, “Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest one’s religion at any time and place of one’s own
197
choosing.”
Lord Hoffmann stated that the student could have
gone to another school even though there would have been some inconvenience and, consequently, there was no infringement on the
198
There is a statutory duty to prostudent’s rights under Article 9.
199
vide education, but not at any school the individual chooses.
Parliament gave schools the right to impose regulations regarding uniforms because local government can better determine what is
200
The manner in
appropriate considering all of the circumstances.
which the school created the regulations was not important because
201
the substance of the regulations is more important than procedure.
Some additional policy considerations include “promot[ing] the ability of people of diverse races, religions, and cultures to live together
202
in harmony.”
E. R v. Leeds City Council Education

203

In Leeds, nine students brought claims against their local education authority because the LEA refused to provide the students with
204
transportation to the school of their choice.
The claims were
brought under the European Convention for Human Rights of 1950
205
and the Race Relations Act of 1976. All of the students were members of a Jewish community in Leeds, England, but were attending
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 34.
Denbigh High School, ¶ 34.
Id.
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶ 57.
Id. ¶ 62•63.
Denbigh High School, ¶ 68.
Id. ¶ 97.
[2005] EWHC 2495 (Admin.).
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 3.
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schools in Manchester because their parents wanted them to receive a
206
Jewish education.
A Rabbi who testified on the students’ behalf explained that, although Jewish law does not require the children to attend an orthodox Jewish school, he recommended that they attend such a school if
possible because Jewish education would ensure that Jewish children
remained within the faith and would also promote better citizen207
ship.
The Rabbi added that the city council did not provide a Jewish high school in Leeds, and although a Jewish studies center was
created at the local high school, it had evolved into a multi-cultural
208
center. As a result, parents who wanted their children to receive an
orthodox Jewish education were forced to pay for transportation to
209
the high school in Manchester.
A provision in the free transportation policy states that students
are eligible for free transportation if the school is outside of the
Leeds area, a diocese designates the nearest appropriate school, and
210
the school is more than three miles away from the student’s home.
All of the other students who chose schools outside of Leeds travel
between 3.4 and 5.9 miles, but the Jewish students wished to attend a
211
As in the American cases, students
school located 45 miles away.
who live in Leeds and wish to attend a school elsewhere are likely to
212
Furthermore, the
be motivated by sincere religious convictions.
district estimates that on average it spends approximately £363 per
year for each student who is provided with free transportation, but it
would have to pay an estimated £1554 per student to transport the
213
Jewish students to Manchester.
Although only nine students are
parties to this case, there are currently thirty-three students who
214
travel to Manchester to receive an orthodox Jewish education.
The parties alleged that under the Education Act 1996, the LEA
215
The Queen’s Bench
was required to provide such transportation.
206

Id. ¶ 1, 4.
Id. ¶ 4.
208
Id.
209
Leeds, ¶ 4.
210
Id. ¶ 9.
211
Id. ¶ 10.
212
Id. ¶ 11.
213
Id. ¶ 13.
214
Id.
215
Leeds, ¶ 16. In England, parents are required to send children of compulsory
school age to school. Education Act, 1996, c. 56, '7. The Education Act further provides that
[a] child shall not be taken to have failed to attend regularly at the
school if the parent proves- (a) that the school at which the child is a
207
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Division considered the following factors: the underlying reasons for
the parental preference, the suitability of the chosen school, the suitability of an alternate school, various financial considerations, and
216
Additionally, an
other policy considerations enacted by the LEA.
LEA’s decision not to provide free transportation to a student will not
217
Due to the cost associated with
be reversed unless it is irrational.
providing the students with free transportation to Manchester and
the existence of a high school in Leeds which offered some Hebrew
studies, the Queen’s Bench Division refused to provide free transpor218
tation to the students.
One persuasive argument offered by the parents is that the
219
transportation system is inherently discriminatory.
For Christian
children, the LEA will consult with a local diocese, who specifies the
220
However, the LEA determined on its own
closest suitable school.
that the closest suitable school for the Jewish children is a non-faith
school in Leeds, “which offers Hebrew studies in years seven and
221
eight, some Jewish assemblies, and Hebrew as a modern language.”
The court agreed with the LEA that the free transportation program
was not discriminatory because if a Jewish high school was located
within a reasonable distance, then the LEA would have authorized
222
the free transportation.
However, the court did not consider that
there are many more Christian schools in England, so that Christian
children are more likely to find a suitable school within a relatively
close distance. Although the requested transportation services would
cost the LEA a significant amount of money, the court should have
considered that all of the Christian students were able to locate a
suitable school within six miles of Leeds, but the closest Jewish high
school was forty-five miles away.
Finally, the parents also asserted several claims under various
223
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights.
The
registered pupil is not within walking distance of the child’s home, and
(b) that no suitable arrangements have been made by the local education authority . . . for any of the following- (i) his transport to and from
the school.
Education Act, 1996, c. 444, ' 4.
216
Leeds, ¶ 18 (citing R v. Dyfed County Council ex parte S, [1944] ELR 320).
217
Id. ¶ 17 (citing R (Jones) v. Ceredigion County Council, [2004] EWHC 1376
(Admin), [2004] ELR 506).
218
Id. ¶ 19.
219
Id. ¶ 21.
220
Id.
221
Id. ¶ 26 (internal quotations omitted).
222
Leeds, ¶ 28–29.
223
Id. ¶ 37.
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most relevant claim was a violation of the right to practice one’s relig224
The court also reion asserted under Article 9 of the Convention.
jected this argument stating that “Article 9 does not protect every act
motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and does not in all cases
guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is
225
Further, the court held that there must be a
dictated by a belief.”
material infringement on religious rights rather than a mere incon226
venience on the manifestation of one’s religious beliefs.
Such a
conclusion is clearly contrary to the delicate tone American courts
use when analyzing Free Exercise cases.
One should notice that the claimants in this case asserted several
claims under both the Education Act and the European Convention
227
for Human Rights.
However, neither one of these enactments appeared to trump the other, at least not within the judge’s opinion.
This is significantly different from the United States, where plaintiffs
usually assert that one piece of legislation violates the supreme law of
the land—the Constitution. Although England wishes to guarantee
all of its citizens certain freedoms, judges can refuse to accommodate
individuals simply based on prior precedent. Therefore, fewer exemptions seem to be granted in England because the plaintiffs have a
harder time defining the right and demonstrating that there was a
material violation.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States will grant students more exemptions for religious reasons than England because it is generally easier for an individual to assert his or her fundamental freedoms under the U.S. Constitution.
Although the British system professes equality and
freedom, it discriminates against minority religions because their
needs are not inherently accommodated. Furthermore, as long as
there are viable alternatives, British courts will not grant exemptions
to students. However, most of the time, the alternatives do not entirely satisfy the student’s needs.

224
225
226
227

Id. ¶ 37; see supra Part III.A.
Id. ¶ 39 (citing Sahin v. Turkey, [2004] ELR 520 (Eur. Ct. H.R.)).
Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 37.

